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THE NEW FACE OF IMPLIED RIGHT
TO SUE JURISPRUDENCE AND THE SEC'S
BEST-PRICE RULE
TOM GARDNERt
INTRODUCTION
One common takeover method in corporate finance is the
tender offer. The term "tender offer" refers to a public offer by an
acquiring company to all stockholders of a publicly traded
corporation. The acquiring entity usually offers a price above
market value to induce the stockholders to tender their shares,
and the offer is contingent on a fixed number of shares being
tendered. The shareholders make a profit on their holdings,
while the bidder aims for control of the corporation and,
consequently, its assets.' Any acquiring party who will own more
than five percent of the target corporation is subject to a number
of requirements set out in the Securities Exchange Act.2
An increase in the use of the tender offer as a takeover
mechanism in the 1960s raised concerns about shareholder
protection.' Investors facing a tender offer had to make difficult
choices based on poor information about the bidding party. In
response, Congress passed the Williams Act in 1968 to provide
more adequate disclosure mechanisms for shareholders.4 One of
the provisions of the Williams Act restricted bidders from
offering a certain price at the beginning of a tender offer and
later increasing the price to encourage more shareholders to
tender their shares. This limitation is known as the "best-price"
rule. The best-price rule is actually a combination of a statute
t J.D. Candidate, 2009, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., 2002,
University of Richmond.
I U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Tender Offer, http://sec.gov/answers/tender.htm
(last visited Jan. 22, 2009).
2 Id.
3 H.R. REP. No. 90-1711 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2811, 2812-13.
1 Id. at 2814.
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and a regulation. Section 78n(d)(7) of the Securities Exchange
Act-originally section 14(d)(7) of the Williams Act 5-states that
a bidder who increases the amount of a tender offer after the
initial offering must pay that increase to holders who have
already tendered their shares. 6 Enacted in 1986, regulation 14d-
10 also prohibits the bidder from decreasing the price of the
tender offer after the initial offering due to the fact that the price
decrease became a popular takeover tactic.7
Shareholders facing a bidder's violation of the best-price rule
have traditionally been able to bring their own lawsuits for
damages. While there is no specific private right to sue explicitly
written into section 14(d)(7), federal courts have read into this
section of the Act an implied private cause of action for aggrieved
shareholders.8 The Ninth Circuit recognized such a right in
Epstein v. MCA, Inc.9 On appeal, however, the Supreme Court
reversed and remanded the case on different grounds. 10 In dicta,
the Court expressly declined to rule as to whether section
14(d)(7) afforded plaintiffs a private cause of action." This non-
ruling, along with a decades-long shift in the Court's
jurisprudence on reading implied private causes of action into
statutes, has left serious doubt as to whether plaintiffs should
still be able to bring a claim under the best-price rule. While
aggrieved shareholders have administrative remedies at their
disposal, concluding that they lack a private cause of action for
tender offer violations would have a dramatic impact on
5 This Note will refer to the statutory best-price rule by its original Williams Act
numbering in order to be consistent with the majority of courts and commentary
cited herein.
6 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (2000 & Supp. 1 2002).
7 HENRY LESSER, SECURITIES LAW TECHNIQUES § 72.05 (2008). Another reason
for enactment of the regulation was the SEC's stance that implied in the statutory
best-price requirement was a mandate of equal treatment of shareholders-even in
situations where 14(d)(7) was not applicable (like a decrease in the price of the
initial tender offer). Uncomfortable with this requirement existing as a simple gloss
on the statute, the SEC enacted the regulatory best-price rule. The requirement that
all shareholders be treated equally leads some commentators and courts to refer to
this as the all-holders/best-price rule. Id.
' See Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 50 F.3d 644, 651 (9th Cir. 1995), reu'd sub nom.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996); Field v. Trump, 850
F.2d 938, 945-46 (2d Cir. 1988); Polaroid Corp. v. Disney, 862 F.2d 987, 996 (3rd Cir.
1988); Katt v. Titan Acquisitions, Ltd., 133 F. Supp. 2d 632, 640 (M.D. Tenn. 2000).
' Epstein, 50 F.3d at 651.
10 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 387 (1996).
" Id. at 370 n.1.
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corporate practices. Despite the relative efficiency of the tender
offer as a takeover mechanism (as compared to longer statutory
mergers), the potential for protracted litigation and billion dollar
damage claims has made this otherwise practical merger tool
disfavored. 12  Indeed, often the mere threat of large securities
class action lawsuits can push companies into settlement
negotiations. 13
This Note argues that an implied right to sue under the best-
price doctrine should no longer be recognized, based on the
Court's current attitude toward reading private causes of action
into statutes. The Court's present method of finding implied
rights to sue is primarily a matter of straightforward statutory
interpretation. 4 That being the case, this Note suggests that
there is nothing in a plain reading of section 14(d)(7) that gives
private parties a right to sue for violations of that section. A
thorough analysis of the statute in light of the Court's current
stance on implied causes of action has been lacking in judicial
opinions involving the best-price rule. Such an analysis would
lead to the conclusion that such a right no longer exists-a
conclusion that simply has not been reached by any court at this
point. Part I of this Note will trace the history of the Court's
stance on reading implied rights to sue into statutes over the
past forty years. Part II will highlight instances where courts
have applied the implied rights doctrine to the best-price rule.
Part III will analyze the current state of the Court's approach to
12 See Eric J. Schwartzman, What It Takes To Make a Consortium Work,
SMARTCAPITAL (Latham & Watkins, New York, N.Y.), Mar. 2006, at 1, 2, available
at http://www.lw.com/upload/pubContenttpdf/pub1544-l.pdf; see also Memorandum
from Mara L. Ransom, Special Counsel, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Aug. 7, 2006)
(providing a chart detailing the decline in U.S. announced tender offers between
2000 and 2006). Note that the chart shows a decline in the use of the tender offer,
but does not necessarily point to private lawsuits as a causal factor. There could be
many factors leading to the decline-one of the most prominent identified by the
Commission and addressed in the 2006 amendments to the best-price rule was
uncertainty as to the scope of the rule in relation to employee severance packages.
See Amendments to the Tender Offer Best-Price Rules, Exchange Act Release No.
34,54684, 71 Fed. Reg. 65,393, at 65,393 (Nov. 8, 2006). While these changes will
hopefully alleviate some of the disincentives to structuring a merger as a tender
offer, they do not address the larger issue of whether a private right should be
recognized under the rule in the first place.
13 See Ben Walther, Note, Employment Agreements and Tender Offers:
Reforming the Problematic Treatment of Severance Plans Under Rule 14d-10, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 774, 783 (2002).
14 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001).
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implied rights and apply it to the best-price rule by arguing that
a plain reading of the statute does not support such a right.
I. A SURVEY OF IMPLIED RIGHT To SUE JURISPRUDENCE
Forty years ago, a private party trying to assert a private
right based on a statute had a powerful ally in J.I. Case Co. v.
Borak."5 In Borak, the Supreme Court affirmed a Seventh
Circuit ruling that a stockholder could sue for damages for a
violation of section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act.16 While
conceding that section 14(a) contained no express rights for
private parties to sue for damages, the Court focused instead on
the statute's purpose of investor protection. This purpose
implied "availability of judicial relief where necessary to achieve
that result."17 The Court's approach to crafting this relief was
unmistakably activist, evinced by its statement that "it is the
duty of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are
necessary to make effective the congressional purpose. To the
Borak Court, the lack of an express and specific private right to
sue was an insignificant barrier for aspiring plaintiffs. A statute
containing a "general" right to sue empowered federal courts to
use any available remedy to grant relief.19 The Court found such
a general right in the language of the statute at issue.20
The idea that federal courts should be vigilant in crafting
relief based on a statute's underlying purpose retained relevancy
15 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
16 Id. at 435. Section 14(a) makes it unlawful for any person to use false or
misleading statements to solicit any proxy in respect to any security registered on
any national securities exchange. Id. at 427 n.1.
17 Id. at 432.
18 Id. at 433.
19 Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946).
20 Borak, 377 U.S. at 433. Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act granted the
district courts jurisdiction over "all suits in equity and actions at law brought to
enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter." 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2000). This
was the "general" rights language from which the Court implied a private right to
sue. The Court in Borak did not invent this reasoning, but rather drew from its
earlier decision in Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., where the Court reasoned:
The power to enforce implies the power to make effective the right of
recovery afforded by the Act. And the power to make the right of recovery
effective implies the power to utilize any of the procedures or actions
normally available to the litigant according to the exigencies of the
particular case. If petitioners' bill states a cause of action when tested by
the customary rules governing suits of such character, the Securities Act
authorizes maintenance of the suit ....
311 U.S. 282, 288 (1940).
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for approximately a decade.21 In 1975, the Court changed
direction from Borak's liberal inquiry into statutory purpose to a
more structured test of congressional intent in Cort v. Ash.22 In
Cort, the Court laid out a four-part test for determining whether
a private right to sue could be read into a statute. The Cort test
examined (1) whether the plaintiff was a member of a special
class for whose benefit the statute was enacted; (2) whether there
was legislative intent, implicit or explicit, to create or deny a
private remedy; (3) whether it was consistent with the
underlying legislative scheme to imply a private remedy; and
(4) whether the cause of action was one traditionally relegated to
state law.23  Under this test, Borak's analysis of statutory
purpose was just one factor to be considered, which by default,
narrowed the scope of the Court's ability to read a private right
into a statute's underlying purpose. Even if such a purpose was
found, the three other factors listed above still needed to be
satisfied.
Standing alone, Cort was not necessarily a bad omen for
plaintiffs' rights. A statute that previously would have been read
as containing a private right under Borak might still pass muster
under Cort-if it displayed a legislative intent to protect a certain
class of persons in an area of law not traditionally left to state
remedies. Four years later, however, in Transamerica Mortgage
Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis24 and Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,25
the Court fleshed out the contours of Cort in a way that
significantly curtailed the scope of Borak's underlying purpose
inquiry. In Redington, the Court held that customers of a
securities brokerage firm did not have an implied cause of action
under section 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act.26 Noting that
a stricter standard for finding implied rights to sue was in place
at the time of the Borak decision, the Court stated that the
ultimate question was one of the congressional intent in the
21 See Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972); Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971); Mills
v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 386 (1970).
22 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
23 Id. The Court used the four-part test to deny plaintiffs a private right to sue
under the Federal Election Campaign Act. Id. at 85.
444 U.S. 11, 15-19 (1979).
25 442 U.S. 560, 575-76 (1979).
26 Id. at 579.
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statute itself.27 In response to plaintiffs argument that the Cort
test required an analysis of legislative purpose, the Court
declared that legislative intent was the crucial issue, and that
underlying purpose was simply one factor in determining
intent.28
In Transamerica, the Court ruled that a shareholder of a
real estate investment trust did not have a private right for
damages under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.29 Even
though the Investment Advisers Act was intended to benefit a
class of persons, which included the plaintiffs, ° the Court held
that plaintiffs had no private damages remedy because (1)the
Investment Advisers Act was completely silent on the question of
a private right of action; (2) the section in question proscribed
certain conduct, but did not create any civil liabilities; and (3) the
Investment Advisers Act included specific enforcement provisions
for the duties imposed by the section of the Act before the
Court.31 Similar to Redington, the Court here lent considerable
weight to discerning legislative intent through statutory
construction.2 Regarding the language in Cort concerning a
class of persons to be protected, the Court stated that "the mere
fact that the statute was designed to protect advisers' clients
does not require the implication of a private cause of action for
damages on their behalf. 33
This distinction between finding intent to protect a class of
persons in a statute and finding an additional private right to
sue for damages was well detailed in a third Supreme Court case
from the same year, Cannon v. University of Chicago.4 In that
case, the petitioner sued a federally funded university under
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 for excluding her
from medical school programs on the basis of gender .3  Here, the
27 Id. at 578.
28 Id. at 575-76.
29 Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 24.
10 Id. at 17.
31 Id. at 18-20. The Court also held that plaintiffs did have a right to contract
rescission, since section 215 of the Investment Advisers Act declared investment
advisers' contracts void if their formation or performance violates the Act. Such a
violation was present here. Id. at 18-19.
2 Id. at 15 ("The question whether a statute creates a cause of action, either
expressly or by implication, is basically a matter of statutory construction.").
3 Id. at 24.
3' 441 U.S. 677, 688-717 (1979).
35 Id. at 680.
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Court found "an unmistakable focus on the benefited class" as
opposed to "simply ... a ban on discriminatory conduct."36 The
Court analogized other civil rights laws where explicit right-
creating language bolstered this "unmistakable focus" on the
benefited class. The Court was more willing to infer a private
right into a statute that included language such as "[a]ll citizens
of the United States shall have the same right,"37 "no person
shall be denied the right to vote,"3" or "[elmployees shall have the
right to organize."39 Although the Court did infer a private right
based on the Cort factors,4" the discussion of "right-creating
language" was Cannon's central contribution to private right
jurisprudence.
Notably, Cannon buttressed its legislative history analysis
with a discussion of the contemporary legal context of the
statute's enactment. The Court noted that Title IX was
patterned after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and that
the two used nearly "identical language to describe the benefited
class."41 This language, as found in Title VI, had already been
found by many federal courts to hold a private right of action.42
Although the Court cautioned that the recent Cort line focused
on strict statutory construction, it still found that the "evaluation
of congressional action in 1972 must take into account its
contemporary legal context."43 So even though Cort narrowed the
scope of Borak's underlying purpose test, Cannon's allowance for
contemporary legal context lent significant weight and flexibility
to the purpose prong of the Cort test.
During this period, the Court's private right to sue
jurisprudence became more limited, although to what extent was
36 Id. at 691-92. Section 901 of Title X provides that "[n]o person in the United
States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000).
37 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 690 n.13 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2000)).
38 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (2000)).
39 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 152 (2000)).
40 Id. at 709.
41 Id. at 695.
42 See Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847, 852 (5th Cir. 1967);
Blackshear Residents Org. v. Hous. Auth., 347 F. Supp. 1138, 1146 (W.D. Tex. 1972);
Hawthorne v. Kenbridge Recreation Ass'n, 341 F. Supp. 1382, 1383-84 (E.D. Va.
1972).
' Cannon, 441 U.S. at 698-99.
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unclear. Although surely more restrictive than the Borak era, it
was uncertain whether this Court was announcing a regime
change. Cort diminished the importance of underlying
congressional purpose by making it just one of four factors to be
considered. 4 Redington refined this test by placing the most
weight on the legislative intent prong45 and by discerning that
this intent was primarily a matter of statutory interpretation.46
Transamerica echoed this idea by emphasizing that statutory
interpretation was the basic inquiry for finding an implied right
to sue.47 While Redington and Transamerica seemed to narrow
the focus of the discussion to statutory interpretation, Cannon
still left plaintiffs a fair amount of leeway by taking into account
the contemporary legal context of a statute's enactment. 8 Since
the move to a more restrictive analysis of implied rights was a
recent development, any statute enacted before Cort-or as in
Cannon, a statute patterned on a statute enacted before Cort49 -
could potentially have a contemporary legal context that would
be very favorable for plaintiffs. A true confirmation of the
doctrinal change would not come about until 2001 in Alexander v.
Sandoval ° when the Court dispelled any doubt as to the scope of
inquiry for finding a private right to sue. The Court held that
private individuals did not have a right to sue to enforce
regulations created under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.51 In no
uncertain terms, the Court stated that its job was to read the
statute and decide if Congress intended to create a private cause
of action. On this point, statutory intent is determinative;
without it no cause of action may be implied, "no matter how
desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible
4 Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
45 Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 577 (1979).
46 Id. at 568; see also California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 297 (1981) ("The
federal judiciary will not engraft a remedy on a statute, no matter how salutary,
that Congress did not intend to provide."); Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers
Union, 451 U.S. 77, 91 (1981) ("In determining whether a federal statute that does
not expressly provide for a particular private right of action nonetheless implicitly
created that right, our task is one of statutory construction.").
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 17 (1979).
4 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 698-99.
4 Id. at 680.
0 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
11 Id. at 293.
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with the statute."52  The Court here elevated statutory
interpretation to such an extent that all other aspects of the Cort
test became tools of discovering legislative intent: "Having sworn
off the habit of venturing beyond Congress' intent, we will not
accept respondents' invitation to have one last drink."53
Sandoval also strictly limited the scope of the "contemporary
legal context" analysis to clarification of the text, which of course
only could be employed if the text itself was ambiguous.54
Decided six years ago, Sandoval is beginning to reverberate
through the lower courts. The Second Circuit, in particular, is
taking notice. In Olmstead v. Pruco Life Insurance Co. of New
Jersey, the Second Circuit drew heavily on Sandoval, observing
that a statute's failure to expressly state a private right of action
creates a presumption that Congress did not intend one.
Tracking the Supreme Court's jurisprudence of implied rights,
the court found that the other Cort factors had been subordinated
to statutory text as merely "interpretive sources."56 Indeed, cases
that showed judicial activism to affect underlying statutory
purpose belonged to an "ancien regime."57  In Hallwood Realty
Partners v. Gotham Partners, the Second Circuit again stated
that the relevant inquiry has been narrowed to "the single
question of whether congressional intent to create a private cause
of action can be found in the relevant statute." 8
52 Id. at 286-87. It is not surprising that Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of
the Court. Eleven years earlier in Thompson v. Thompson, he chided the majority for
relying on Cort "as though its analysis had not been effectively overruled by our
later opinions." 484 U.S. 174, 188. (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring). Scalia went so far
as to call for a "categorical position that federal private rights of action will not be
implied." Id. at 191. The opinions Scalia referred to as overruling Cort were
Transamerica and Redington. Id. at 189. Obviously a majority of the Court did not
hold this view in 1988, but it is clear that Scalia was using Sandoval thirteen years
later as a vehicle to reaffirm the restrictions imposed by Redington and
Transamerica.
53 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 287.
1 Id. at 288 (internal quotations omitted).
55 Olmstead v. Pruco Life Ins. Co. of N.J., 283 F.3d 429, 432 (2d Cir. 2002).
56 Id. at 434.
57 Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 287).
58 Hallwood Realty Partners v. Gotham Partners, 286 F.3d 613, 619 (2d Cir.
2002); see also Susquehanna Area Reg'l Airport Auth. v. Middletown Area Sch. Dist.,
No. 2005 CV 2052, 2006 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 95, at *24. (C.P. Ct. Dauphin
County, Pa. June 13, 2006), affd, 918 A.2d 813 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2007) ("The
landmark case that explains how to determine if a private cause of action exists is
Alexander v. Sandoval.... [T]he key to determining if a statute provides a private
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There is no doubt that Sandoval was almost a total defeat
for potential plaintiffs. The Court nearly closed the door for
implying a private right into a federal statute. Now, in order for
plaintiffs to sue, an implied right would have to be apparent on
the face of the statute. Plaintiffs will have a difficult time
arguing before a court that Congress intended to imply a
remedial right instead of simply writing one expressly into the
statute.59 Sandoval is a recent decision, however, and its full
weight has not been brought to bear in many areas of law. In
securities regulation, and the best-price rule in particular, the
implied rights jurisprudence of thirty years ago is still alive and
kicking.
II. COURT APPLICATION OF THE IMPLIED RIGHTS
DOCTRINE TO THE BEST-PRICE RULE
In 1988, more than a decade before Sandoval, the Second
Circuit found a private right to sue under the best-price rule. In
Field v. Trump, the plaintiff shareholder alleged that the
defendant varied the terms of its tender offer in violation of the
best-price rule during its acquisition of the business Pay'n Save. °
The court found an implied right to sue under the best-price rule,
reversing the dismissal of the plaintiffs claim.6 The court
applied the Cort test, finding that (1) the plaintiffs were among
an intended class of beneficiaries, (2) the sole purpose of the
Williams Act was shareholder protection, (3) a private remedy
would be an effective means of enforcing congressional purpose,
and (4) a cause of action here was not one traditionally left to
state law. The court did not discuss either Redington or
Transamerica, both of which had been good law for nearly a
decade at this point. Instead, it relied on its own reasoning in
cause of action is to interpret the language of the statute itself .. " (citation
omitted)).
" See Victorian v. Miller, 813 F.2d 718, 721 (5th Cir. 1987) ("To establish an
implied private right of action under a federal statute, a plaintiff bears the relatively
heavy burden of demonstrating that Congress affirmatively contemplated private
enforcement when it passed the relevant statute.").
o Field v. Trump, 850 F.2d 938, 940 (2d Cir. 1988).
61 Id. at 946.
62 Id.
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Pryor v. United States Steel Corp., which three years earlier had
implied a private right in section 14(d)(6) of the Williams Act.
The Third Circuit was faced with the same issue three years
later in Polaroid Corp. v. Disney.64  Polaroid alleged that
potential bidder Shamrock violated the all-holders portion 65 of
the best-price rule.66  Instead of following Cort-or either
Transamerica or Redington-the Third Circuit used its own test
for determining whether to imply a private right of action, a test
that included an evaluation of congressional intent.6' Finding
the legislative history of the Williams Act silent as to the intent
to create a private remedy, the court turned to the Cannon
"contemporary legal context" reasoning: "If Congress operated
against a background understanding that courts would create
private remedies that would further the purposes of the statute,
then Congress most likely intended that a statute be enforceable
through a private right of action .... ,,68 Accordingly, the court
found congressional intent to create a private right of action for
shareholders and also found that the statute passed the Third
Circuit's overall test for implying private rights into a statute.69
63 Pryor v. U.S. Steel Corp., 794 F.2d 52, 58 (2d Cir. 1986). Pryor took a more
accurate survey of the Court's jurisprudence by discussing the effects of both
Transamerica and Redington on the Cort test, but this analysis did not seem to
really affect the court's application of Cort. Whereas Transamerica warned that
identification of a right vested in a protected class did not necessarily lead to the
implication of a private remedy, Pryor held that "[b]oth the identification of
beneficiaries and the substantive nature of the right created suggest that Congress
intended to create a private right of action under Section 14(d)(6)." Id. at 57; see also
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 24 (1979). Field
piggybacked Pryor by stating that the best-price rule "certainly provides at least as
strong a basis for the implication of a private remedy as does Section 14(d)(6)." Field,
850 F.2d at 946.
862 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1988).
65 Regulation 14d-10 includes the all-holders rule, which states that a tender
offer must be open to all holders of that class of shares. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-
10(a)(1) (2008).
' See Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 990.
67 Id. at 994. The test created by the Third Circuit and used in Polaroid posed
three questions for a statute-derived rule: (1) "whether the agency rule is properly
within the scope of the enabling statute," (2) "whether the statute under which the
rule was promulgated properly permits the implication of a private right of action,"
and (3) "whether implying a private right of action will further the purpose of the
enabling statute." Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 764 F.2d 939, 947 (3d
Cir. 1985). The Angelastro test is similar to the Cort test in that it examines both
congressional intent and underlying legislative purpose.
68 Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 995.
69 Id. at 996-97.
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Seven years later, the Ninth Circuit made a similar finding
in Epstein v. MCA, Inc.7 ° As part of Matsushita's acquisition of
MCA, Inc.-a $6.1 billion deal-MCA's chief executive officer
exchanged his shares for stock in an MCA-owned subsidiary
instead of tendering his shares like other holders, while MCA's
chief operating officer received an extra $21 million over the
price he received for his tendered shares.71  Some MCA
shareholders brought suit alleging violations of the best-price
rule.72 Marshalling the rationales of Field, Pryor, and Polaroid,
the court found the statutory language that a bidder "shall pay"
any increase in consideration to all shareholders of the same
class was "more than adequate under existing Supreme Court
case law to support a finding of congressional intent to create a
private right of action for violations of section 14(d)(7)." 73 The
Ninth Circuit expressly rejected any evidence of a "sea change in
the Court's implied right of action jurisprudence," calling it
"wishful thinking" on the part of the defendants. 4
When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Epstein, the
opportunity was ripe to settle the question of whether private
plaintiffs could sue for violations of the best-price rule. As is
often the case, however, the Court did not rule on that which it
did not have to. The appeal was not centered on the best-price
rule, but rather on whether a federal court could withhold full
faith and credit from a state court ruling that approved a class
action settlement if the settlement released claims within the
exclusive jurisdiction of federal courts. 75 The possible existence
of a private remedy under the best-price rule was mentioned only
in dicta 76 and left lower courts no closer to an answer. The court
stated: "We express no opinion in this case on the existence of a
private cause of action under §§ 14(d)(6) and (7) of the
[Securities] Exchange Act [of 1934],... the statutory authority
70 50 F.3d 644 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996).
71 See id. at 647-48.
72 Id. at 648.
13 Id. at 652.
14 Id. at 651. The court even took the time to single out Justice Scalia's
concurrence in Thompson and stated that Scalia was the only justice taking a hard-
line, anti-implied rights stance. See id. at 651-52.
11 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 369 (1996), rev'g
Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 50 F.3d 644 (9th Cir. 1995).
76 See id. at 370 n.1.
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for Rule 14d-10."77 Given a chance to settle the issue, the Court
refused.
Since the Court's express non-ruling on the issue in
Matsushita, it is not surprising that subsequent lower court
decisions have more or less followed the precedents of Field,
Polaroid, and Epstein. In Perera v. Chiron Corp.,7 the District
Court for the Northern District of California denied dismissal of
plaintiffs 14d-10 claim operating on the underlying assumption
that this type of private claim was valid in the first place.79 The
implication that the court assumed the validity of the 14d-10
claim is supported by the fact that the court analyzed whether
there was a private right under 10b-13;8 0 if the court thought
there was such an issue for the best-price rule, it most likely
would have touched on that in its opinion. The District Court for
the Middle District of Tennessee, for example, used the Cort test
to provide a thorough analysis of the validity of 14d-10 claims
and found an implied private right to sue in Katt v. Titan
Acquisitions, Ltd."' Similar to Perera, the Second Circuit in
Gerber v. Computer Associates International, Inc. evaluated the
sufficiency of plaintiffs best-price claims on the assumption that
the plaintiff could validly bring those claims in the first place. 2
Finally, the District Court for the Eastern District of New York
recently affirmed the existence of a private remedy under the
best-price rule in In re Luxottica Group S.p.A., citing Epstein,
Field, and Polaroid.3
Although Sandoval was decided before both Luxottica and
Gerber, neither case mentioned Sandoval or its ramifications.
Luxottica offered no analysis of its own; instead, it simply relied
on Second, Third, and Ninth Circuit precedent.8 4 Katt also relied
heavily on pre-Sandoval precedent by grounding its analysis in
the Cort test. 5 To date, no court has done an analysis of a
private remedy under the best-price rule that takes into account
the effect of Sandoval on the implied rights doctrine. Part III of
77 Id.
7' No. C-95-2075 SW, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22503 (N.D. Cal. May 8, 1996).
71 Id. at*12.
so Id. at *14.
81 133 F. Supp. 2d 632, 639-40 (M.D. Tenn. 2000).
82 Gerber v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 303 F.3d 126, 135-36 (2d Cir. 2002).
83 In re Luxottica Group S.p.A., 293 F. Supp. 2d 224, 230 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
84 Id.
85 Katt, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 639.
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this Note will undertake such an analysis to show that a private
right should no longer be recognized under the best-price rule.
III. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK OF THE BEST-PRICE RULE
SHOWS No CONGRESSIONAL INTENT To CREATE A
PRIVATE RIGHT To SUE
Sandoval leaves no doubt that finding an implied remedy in
a federal statute is a matter of discerning congressional intent
through statutory interpretation.8 6  The idea that Sandoval
signaled a regime change is somewhat misleading, since the
Court elevated congressional intent above other factors as early
as Transamerica and Redington. Coming four years on the heels
of Cort, those cases basically turned the four-factor test into a
one-factor test of congressional intent. Yet somehow Cort
retained more credibility than Redington and Transamerica
really afforded it. Federal courts have consistently cited the Cort
test,8 8 and some state courts have adopted Cort as the primary
test for inferring private remedies from state statutes. 9 Perhaps
it is a testament to the staying power of a clearly formulated
judicial "test," but regardless, Sandoval has reaffirmed the
proposition that congressional intent is the determining factor in
finding a private right to sue.
A. Applying Sandoval to the Best-Price Rule
This focus on congressional intent raises the issue of to what
extent Congress can "intend" to implicitly write a cause of action
into a statute. As the Court has admitted, a focus on whether
Congress had in mind a private cause of action and simply forgot
to "codify its evident intention" would make the implied cause of
action doctrine "a virtual dead letter."90  On the other hand,
86 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001).
87 See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
88 See Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 50 F.3d 644, 650 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd sub nom.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996); Field v. Trump, 850
F.2d 938, 946 (2d Cir. 1988); Polaroid Corp. v. Disney, 862 F.2d 987, 996 (3d Cir.
1988); Pryor v. U.S. Steel Corp., 794 F.2d 52, 57 (2d Cir. 1986); Katt, 133 F. Supp. 2d
at 639.
89 See Machan v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 116 P.3d 342, 347 (Utah 2005);
Upperman v. Grange Indem. Ins. Co., 135 Ohio Misc. 2d 8, 11 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1.
2005); Estate of Witthoeft v. Kiskaddon, 733 A.2d 623, 626 (Pa. 1999).
9o Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 179 (1988). This was basically the
source of Scalia's ire: "I am at a loss to imagine what congressional intent to create a
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Sandoval's express restriction of the "contemporary legal
context" doctrine91 limits both the tools available to the judiciary
and the scope of their application in seeking out congressional
intent beyond the text itself. Sandoval stated that contemporary
context could only be used to show that (1) Congress enacted a
statute patterned on similar language that had previously been
held by courts to contain an implied private right of action, or
(2) the legal context simply strengthened a conclusion that was
already supported by the weight of the text.92 Sandoval makes it
clear that any non-textual methods of finding a private remedy
must be directly supported by the text of the statute itself.
The text of the statute at issue shows no congressional intent
to create a private right of action. Section 14(d)(7) states that
"[w]here any person varies the terms of a tender offer ... such
person shall pay the increased consideration to each security
holder."93 The pertinent question is whether Congress intended
that this language create a cause of action for plaintiffs; an
analysis of the text does not support such a finding. In order to
find congressional intent to create an implied right, the Court
requires a statute to have "rights-creating language."94 There is
more of a reason to infer a private remedy if Congress drafted the
statute with "an unmistakable focus" on the benefited class as
opposed to a "ban on discriminatory conduct."9 5  By contrast,
statutes that focus on the party regulated instead of the class
private right of action might mean, if it does not mean that Congress had in mind
the creation of a private right of action." Id. at 188 (Scalia, J., concurring).
91 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 288.
92 Id. The first possibility is a reference to Cannon and the Court's finding there
that Title IX was patterned directly on the language of Title VI. Cannon v. Univ. of
Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 696 (1979).
" 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (2000 & Supp. I 2002). Regulation 14d-10, the
regulatory part of the all-holders/best-price rule, states that "[n]o bidder shall make
a tender offer unless." 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10(a) (2008). The primary concern here,
however, is with the language of the statute. As the Court has stated on multiple
occasions, a regulation can only offer a private remedy if it has first been created by
a statute. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 291 ("[I]t is most certainly incorrect to say that
language in a regulation can conjure up a private cause of action that has not been
authorized by Congress. Agencies may play the sorcerer's apprentice but not the
sorcerer himself."); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 577 n.18 (1979)
("[Tihe language of the statute and not the rules must control.").
14 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 288 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Cannon,
441 U.S. at 691-93.
'- Cannon, 441 U.S. at 691-92.
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protected create "no implication of an intent to confer rights on a
particular class of persons. "91
Admittedly, section 14(d)(7) identifies both a class of persons
to be protected and proscribes certain conduct by another class:
"Where any person varies the terms of a tender offer.., such
person shall pay the increased consideration to each security
holder... ."I' "Any person" is the potential bidder whose conduct
is being regulated; "each security holder" is a member of the class
of persons being protected. Courts finding a private remedy in
the best-price rule have stated that the language "shall pay the
increased consideration to each security holder" specifically
confers a substantive right on shareholders, and therefore, a
private right of action.98  As the Supreme Court stated in
Transamerica, however, a conferral of a substantive right on
certain parties by a statute "does not require the implication of a
private cause of action for damages on their behalf."9 9  Even
assuming that the statute creates a "right" for shareholders to
receive any increase in the tender offer, courts have skipped a
step in the analysis to say that this necessarily creates a private
cause of action as well. The substantive right conferred must be
accompanied by clear right-creating language.
The statutory basis for the best-price rule does not contain
the necessary right-creating language. While the statute does
identify a class of persons to be protected, it lacks the
unmistakable focus on that class that is necessary to infer a
private remedy."' As stated in Cannon and discussed in Part I,
an unmistakable focus on the benefited class is demonstrated by
such language as "[a]ll citizens of the United States shall have
the same right,"' 0'1 "no person shall be denied the right to vote,"10 2
or "[e]mployees shall have the right to organize." °3 On the other
hand, 14(d)(7) places the regulatory emphasis on whether "any
96 California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 294 (1981).
9 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (2000 & Supp. 1 2002).
98 Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 50 F.3d 644, 651 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd sub nom.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996) (emphasis omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see Field v. Trump, 850 F.2d 938, 946 (2d Cir.
1988); Katt v. Titan Acquisitions, Ltd., 133 F. Supp. 2d 632, 640 (M.D. Tenn. 2000).
9 Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 24 (1979).
'00 See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 691-93.
101 Id. at 690 n.13 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2000)).
102 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (2000)).
103 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 152 (2000)).
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person varies the terms of a tender offer"104 -here the language
of the statute is focused on the party being regulated, even if the
end result is to confer a right on the protected class. So while
courts finding a private remedy have invoked the language that
the offeror "shall pay the increased consideration to each security
holder,"105 this reasoning ignores the fact that the right to the
consideration is attained through language that primarily
centers on banning discriminatory conduct by the offeror.
The best-price rule can also be effectively contrasted with
antitrust statutes, which rely heavily on private enforcement:
"[A]ny person who shall be injured... by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district
court... and shall recover threefold the damages by him
sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's
fee. 10 6 Conversely, section 14(d)(7) focuses on regulation of the
bidding party and its behavior in the tender offer process. It is
true that one of the key underlying purposes of this language is
minority shareholder protection; however, the test of finding a
private remedy is no longer a matter of analyzing the underlying
purpose of a statute's enactment. As worded, the statute has a
stronger focus on the class regulated than the one protected.
B. The Legislative History of the Williams Act
Additionally, there is nothing in the legislative history of the
Williams Act that would lead to a different interpretation of the
statute. Legislative history and underlying purpose are available
under the current regime as tools of statutory construction to the
extent that they can shed light on any ambiguities on the face of
the statute. The legislative history of the Williams Act reveals
that the primary purpose of the statute was to provide full
disclosure of information during the takeover bidding process:
The bill avoids tipping the balance of regulation either in favor
of management or in favor of the person making the takeover
bid. It is designed to require full and fair disclosure for the
104 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (2000 & Supp. 1 2002).
105 Id.
106 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000) ("[Any person
injured.., by reason of a violation... may sue therefor ... and shall recover
threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee ... ").
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benefit of investors while at the same time providing the offeror
and management equal opportunity to fairly present their
case. 107
Far from showing intent to create a remedy to aggrieved
shareholders, the history of the bill shows that the primary
concern was informational in nature. A cash tender offer at the
time required that "no information need be filed or disclosed to
shareholders," so the bill was "designed to make the relevant
facts known so that shareholders have a fair opportunity to make
their decision."108
The history of the Williams Act stands in stark contrast to
the committee reports of section 1988 of Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972.109 On the subject of private enforcement,
the committee report states that "[a]ll of these civil rights laws
depend heavily upon private enforcement, and fee awards have
proved an essential remedy if private citizens are to have a
meaningful opportunity to vindicate the important Congressional
policies which these laws contain."110 The congressional record
included statements such as "it is essential that private
enforcement be made possible by authorizing attorneys' fees in
this essential area of the law."1 Conversely, the house report on
section 14(d)(7) stated that "[tihe purpose of this provision is to
assure fair treatment of those persons who tender their shares at
the beginning of the tender period, and to assure equality of
treatment among all shareholders who tender their shares."12
There is nothing in the record to indicate that Congress
107 H.R. REP. No. 90-1711, at 3 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2811,
2813.
1o Id. This is the language from which courts have drawn the conclusion that
the Williams Act's underlying purpose was the protection of shareholders, and
therefore, section 14(d)(7) should be read as containing a private remedy. This
ignores the express language that the Act was meant to provide an even playing
field where neither takeover bidders nor entrenched management could gain an
unfair advantage.
1o Section 1988 comprised the Civil Rights Attorneys Fee Awards Act, which
provided that in an action to enforce certain civil rights provisions, the court may
award the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee as part of its costs.
42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000). This was the provision at issue in Cannon, and the
express statements in the record in favor of private enforcement contributed heavily
to the Court finding a private remedy implicit in the statute. Cannon v. Univ. of
Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 701 (1979).
no S. REP. NO. 94-1011, at 2 (1976).
"' 122 CONG. REC. 31472 (1976) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
112 H.R. REP. No. 90-1711 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2811, 2821.
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contemplated private enforcement to achieve this equality of
treatment. As the Court stated in Redington, "implying a private
right of action on the basis of congressional silence is a hazardous
enterprise, at best."
113
C. Policy Considerations
Nor are there any overriding policy justifications for finding
an implied right to sue. Courts that have found a private remedy
in the best-price rule argue that without such a remedy,
plaintiffs will not be afforded relief. These courts find that the
injunctive relief afforded by the SEC needs to be supplemented
by a private remedy.1 14 Yet, there is nothing to suggest that the
SEC's enforcement mechanisms are inadequate to protect
aggrieved shareholders. The Commission has the authority to
bring an action in federal court to seek injunctive relief
"[w]henever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is
engaged or is about to engage in acts or practices constituting a
violation of any provision of this title.""5 This provision provides
appropriate relief when a takeover bidder has increased the
amount of his initial tender offer-the Commission can bring an
action seeking an injunction from a district court to halt the
takeover process until the bidder pays to the aggrieved
shareholders the appropriate increase in consideration."6 This
effectively offers the same remedy as a private suit; if the bidding
party wants to continue the takeover process, it must pay the
increase in consideration. Additionally, the Act authorizes the
Justice Department to seek criminal charges for any willful
violations of the Act's provisions."7
113 Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 571 (1979).
114 See Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 50 F.3d 644, 651 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd sub nom.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996); Katt v. Titan
Acquisitions, Ltd., 133 F. Supp. 2d 632, 640 (M.D. Tenn. 2000).
115 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(1) (2000).
116 The court in Katt argued that injunctive relief was inadequate because "any
penalties are paid into the Treasury of the United States." Katt, 133 F. Supp. 2d at
640. This is a misreading of the provision. The "penalties" alluded to in Katt are part
of a civil penalty provision that is separate from the injunctive provision. So while it
is true that any civil penalties are to be paid into the Treasury, this does not affect
relief available under the provision authorizing injunctive relief. See
15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3) (2000).
117 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a) (2000). Although there has never been an attempt to bring
a criminal proceeding for a violation of the best-price rule, the availability of such an
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Denying plaintiffs a private right to sue should not place an
undue burden on the justifiable expectations of private parties to
have a remedy under the best-price rule. Such prudential
considerations need to be taken into account during an
ideological shift by the Court,11 but here such considerations are
not weighty enough to argue against reading the statute as
intended. Eliminating a private remedy should not leave
plaintiffs vulnerable to takeover bidders since the SEC can afford
effective relief through statutory provisions already in place. 119
While there are legitimate concerns over the resources available
to the SEC to pursue enforcement actions, 2 ° only time and
empirical evidence can show the extent to which elimination of a
private right to sue might result in aggrieved plaintiffs and non-
complying takeover parties. It is logical, however, that reading
the best-price rule as originally intended-as primarily a
disclosure provision and not a private cause of action for
damages-will, by itself, reduce its role as a plaintiffs sword.
Without the potential for seven-figure (or larger) settlement
value, it is very likely that plaintiffs and their attorneys will be
less aggressive in pursuing perceived violations of the best-price
rule.
Such deterrence on its face might seem like an open
invitation to malfeasance on the part of corporate takeover
parties. On closer examination, however, much litigation in this
area has stemmed more from longstanding confusion as to the
operative scope of what constitutes a tender offer and its effective
timeframe than to outright wrongdoing on the part of the bidding
party.'21 This uncertainty also suggests that any reasonable
action demonstrates that the Commission's authority is not as powerless as these
courts have made it out to be.
118 See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 677 (1971) ("In adopting a
particular constitutional principle, this Court very properly weighs the nature and
purposes of various competing alternatives ... as well as the extent to which
justifiable expectations have grown up surrounding one rule or another.").
119 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d)(1)-(3) (2000).
120 See generally James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, SEC Enforcement
Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737 (2003).
121 See Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 50 F.3d 644, 654 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd sub nom.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996); Field v. Trump, 850
F.2d 938, 943-44 (2d Cir. 1988); Katt, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 640-44; see also Jason A.
Gonzalez, Sunglasses: The Secret to Making Tender Offers Fashionable, 1 N.Y.U. J.L.
& BuS. 335, 335-36 (2005); Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An
Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 613, 691-92 (1988).
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reliance by plaintiffs on the provision would be wary and
tentative at best. Finally, if prudential issues are to be
considered, the chilling effect that expansive readings of the best-
price rule have had on the viability of the tender offer as a
business mechanism 122 outweighs any threat that elimination of
a private remedy poses to shareholders.
There would also be no finality in reading the best-price rule
as having no implied remedy. If courts followed this action and
Congress disapproved, it could simply amend the statute. In
1994, the Supreme Court in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., reversed a trend in the lower
courts that allowed a private party to sue another party for
aiding and abetting a Rule 10b-5 violation of the Securities
Exchange Act. 123 In response, Congress, a year later, passed the
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which expressly
authorized the SEC to enforce exactly the type of aiding and
abetting charge that the Court had denied plaintiffs in Central
Bank. 24 If the Court were to deny plaintiffs a private remedy
under the best-price rule, then Congress has the power to
supersede the Court's decision. 2
5
CONCLUSION
"Obviously, then, when Congress wished to provide a private
damages remedy, it knew how to do so and did so expressly."1 26
This statement from Redington shows the extent to which the
Court has retreated from the Borak ideology that "it is the duty
of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary
to make effective the congressional purpose."1 27 The new regime
122 Walther, supra note 13, at 780, 808; see also Amendments to the Tender
Offer Best-Price Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 34,54684, 71 Fed. Reg. 65,393, at
65,394 (Nov. 8, 2006) ("We also intended that the amendments would reduce a
regulatory disincentive to structuring an acquisition of securities as a tender
offer ... ").
123 Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511
U.S. 164, 191 (1994).
124 See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2000).
125 Judicial action reading implied private remedies into statutes implicates
certain separation of power issues; courts take on a legislative role by finding
remedies not expressly created by Congress. For a critical assessment disapproving
of this type of judicial activism, see Justice Powell's dissent in Cannon. Cannon v.
Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 730-31 (Powell, J., dissenting).
126 Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 572 (1979).
127 J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964).
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of judicial restraint in private rights jurisprudence requires
courts to reexamine their methodology for finding such rights.
Courts that have found private rights under the best-price rule
have built their arguments using tools that are less effective
after Sandoval-like underlying statutory purpose,
contemporary legal context, and the practical effects of such a
remedy. The new test of private rights jurisprudence, statutory
interpretation, leaves plaintiffs claiming a violation of the best-
price rule without a foundation. No court has recognized this
change with respect to the best-price rule yet, although Sandoval
is slowly reaching the lower courts, including the Second Circuit.
Under a test of congressional intent through statutory
interpretation, the best-price rule does not meet the
requirements for finding an implied right to sue, nor does the
legislative history show any intent on the part of Congress to
create a private remedy. Given the Court's current approach to
reading implied rights into statutes, it is time for a judicial
reexamination of the best-price rule.
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